Allison Eid
From Judgepedia
| Colorado Supreme Court |
|---|
|
| Sitting justices |
| Mary Mullarkey Gregory Hobbs Alex Martinez Michael Bender Nancy Rice Nathan Coats Allison Eid |
| Former justices |
| Colorado on Judgepedia |
Contents |
Allison H. Eid was sworn in as the 95th Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court on March 13, 2006. She was appointed by Governor Bill Owens (R) to take the place of retiring justice Rebecca Kourlis. Justice Eid currently stands for retention vote in January 2009, in order to serve her first full (ten-year) term.
Retention election
Colorado voters elected to retain Justice Eid overwhelmingly on the November 2008 ballot; she was retained with 74.6% of the vote and will serve a 10-year term.[1]
Personal/marital
Judge Eid's husband, the Honorable Troy A. Eid, is the United States Attorney for the District of Colorado. He serves as Colorado’s chief federal criminal prosecutor and represents the United States in civil cases where the government is a party to a lawsuit.[2] Nominated by President George W. Bush, Troy was unanimously confirmed by the United States Senate and took office on August 11, 2006. He is Colorado’s 41st U.S. Attorney since Abraham Lincoln made the first such appointment for the newly created Colorado Territory in 1861. Troy’s father immigrated to the United States from Egypt in 1957, and Troy is the first Arab-American ever to serve as a presidentially appointed U.S. Attorney.
Legal education and experience
Before joining the Court, Justice Eid was the Solicitor General of the State of Colorado, serving as the chief legal officer to the Colorado Attorney General and representing Colorado officials and agencies in state and federal court. She was also a tenured Associate Professor of Law at the University of Colorado School of Law, teaching Constitutional Law, Legislation, and Torts, and writing on the topic of constitutional federalism.
Prior to joining the faculty of the University of Colorado School of Law, Justice Eid practiced commercial and appellate litigation with the Denver office of the national law firm of Arnold & Porter. She clerked for the Honorable Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, and for Judge Jerry E. Smith of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Houston, Texas.
2006 Appointment
Owens seeks Kourlis replacement
Colorado Supreme Court Justice Rebecca Love Kourlis, a Republican who won the respect of people in both parties for her intellect, problem-solving and skill at working smoothly with her colleagues, announced Monday that she will leave the state's highest court.[3] Governor Owens said he likely will appoint a conservative justice to replace Kourlis - one that is a "strict constructionist." Owens said he would not support a judicial candidate with a track record of being an "activist judge."
"A strict constructionist is a person who doesn't try to read into the law and constitution more than is there," Owens said. "The opposite of that would be people who read their own views into it. I'm a person who for the last 20 years believed the court should try to interpret the law and not try to expand it to create new law."
Owens has named one other justice to the Colorado Supreme Court, Nathan B. Coats, a former Denver prosecutor and a Republican, in 2000. He said he won't necessarily appoint another woman to replace Kourlis, who was the third woman named to the state's highest court. He also wouldn't rule out naming a Democrat.
Owens picks Eid
Justice Eid took her seat at the Supreme Court on March 13, 2006, becoming the second Supreme Court appointment of the Owen's (gubernatorial) administration. After her ascension to Colorado's Supreme Court, Eid said that, as a new member of the Court, she would not weigh in on any case that she personally prosecuted or supervised. As a result, she recused herself from many cases during her first year.[4] At the time of her appointment, Justice Eid's annual salary was reported to be $119,739.[5]
Endorsements
Nominated by Governor Bill Owens in February 2006 to take the seat of retiring Justice Rebecca Kourlis, Justice Eid received the endorsement of the Colorado Civil Justice League. At the time of her nomination, Jeff Weist, head of the CCJL had this to say about Justice Eid:
"Allison Eid has the credentials and experience to analyze not only the legal issues in a case, but the real impact out-of-control litigation has on Colorado's economy. While there remains a majority on the Supreme Court in favor of expanding liability beyond what the General Assembly intended, we are pleased Justice Kourlis will be replaced with someone with similar restraint."[6]
Governor Owens described Eid as a "premier legal scholar with superb real-world experience."[7] He also remarked that "[Justice Eid] will interpret the law as it is written, stand firm on legal principles and carry out her duties in a professional and collegial manner."[8] Former Justice Kourlis was also pleased with her replacement.[9]
Political affiliation
Republican. For her 2006 appointment, there are no known records of contributions. Justice Eid will face a retention vote in January 2009.
Recusals
On Initiative #55
On December 31, 2003, the "Defend Colorado Now" initiative was filed by Congressman Tom Tancredo (R) and carried forward by Dr. Bill Heron. In 2004, the initiative was challenged by the open borders lobby and taken to the Colorado Supreme Court, who approved the initiative's wording; the entire process, though, stalled the initiative's chance of making the 2004 ballot. The proposed initiative would have prohibited illegal immigrants in Colorado from receiving all taxpayer-funded public services except those required by the federal government - K-12 education, emergency medical care and assistance in the event of a public safety emergency.
After Colorado House Bill 1271 was defeated (the bill was supposed to implement the initiative's intent since only tax-related initiatives are allowed in odd-numbered years), DCN had the initiative re-affirmed by the Colorado Title Setting Board.
In late January, 2006 the initiative (re-filed) was challenged in front of the Colorado Supreme Court. Despite the Court's speedy rulings on other initiatives for the year (and their previous approval of the initiative's wording), the Court delayed issuing a ruling on the DCN initiative until June 12.
On June 12, 2006 the Supreme Court issued a (4-2) ruling that the initiative was not "single-subject" and therefore could not be on the upcoming ballot. Two weeks later, the Court denied the DCN's petition for a re-hearing.[10] Justice Martinez wrote the majority decision, with Justices Mullarkey, Hobbs, and Bender concurring; Justices Coats and Rice dissented. Justice Eid recused herself.
Justice Martinez wrote that the measure asks voters to approve two subjects: decreasing taxpayer funds for medical and social services, and restricting "administrative services" such as registering a vehicle or filing property deeds with the county recorder.[11]
In dissent Justices Coats and Rice expressed outrage, noting that "once again the majority finds a popular-initiated proposal for amending the state constitution unsuitable for consideration by the electorate," even though the Initiative "contains a single mandate," of restricting government services to illegal immigrants, and further noting a "lack of consistency in applying the single-subject requirement" that "understands the term 'subject' to be so elastic as to give this court unfettered discretion to either approve or disapprove virtually any popularly-initiated ballot measure at will."
Recused from gun-law appeal
In June of 2006, Jusicte Eid recused herself from an appeal before the Colorado Supreme Court that involved the City of Denver's challenge to Colorado state law which pre-empted some of Denver's anti-gun laws. As a result of the recuse, the Court was deadlocked 3-3, and the decision of the presiding Denver District Judge stood (Denver would retain some of its gun laws, such as the "assaults weapons" ban, the "Saturday Night Special ban" and the near-prohibition on carrying open firearms). As Solicitor General, Justice Eid had represented Colorado (and against the City of Denver) during oral arguments in December of 2005.[12]
Notable rulings
On Contract Enforcement
SUMMARY: Justice Eid has ruled consistently with the plain language of Colorado law in matters of contract enforcement.
Justices Eid and Rice dissented with the majority opinion, authored by Justice Martinez, which found that a teacher whose contract was not renewed, but who did not receive timely notice of this failure to renew, (1) was entitled to an entire year's salary; (2) was under no obligation to attempt to mitigate his damages by finding another job; and (3) was entitled to a year's salary even though he immediately found an equal-paying job.
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Allison Eid, objected to the finding that the teacher was entitled to an entire year of back pay where he had not lost a year's salary, since he immediately found another job. The dissent noted that Colorado contracts law is "clear that breach of employment contract damages are to be offset by earnings from alternative employment," and that since this was an employment contract, the court should apply common law contract principles, such as the duty to mitigate damages, and reduce the plaintiff's damages award to the extent that lost earnings were avoided.
* ON ADHERENCE TO COMMON LAW CONTRACT PRINCIPLES: "When [a] renewed contract is subsequently breached by the district, as occurred in this case, the probationary teacher is entitled to ordinary contract remedies. These include * * * contract damages. Because mitigation is a longstanding principle of contract damages-a principle that the majority fails to employ in this case-I respectfully dissent from Part II.C.2 of the opinion."
* ON ADHERENCE TO COMMON LAW CONTRACT PRINCIPLES: "The majority's mistake, in my view, is to omit an important principle of common law contract damages from that remedy-that is, mitigation. Colorado law is clear that breach of employment contract damages are to be offset by earnings from alternative employment. Here, the majority awards a contract damages remedy that mistakenly ignores a longstanding component of the common law."
* ON ADHERENCE TO COMMON LAW CONTRACT PRINCIPLES AND PUBLIC POLICY: "The majority rejects mitigation on a third ground: public policy. It concludes that mitigation would allow school districts to give insufficient notice “without repercussion” and leave probationary teachers not “appropriately compensated.” In my view, mitigation would lead to neither of these results. The goal of contract damages is to place the plaintiff in the same position he or she would have been in had the breach not occurred-not one that is better or worse. As applied to this case, [the terminated teacher] got paid more in his alternative employment than what he would have made at Hanover Junior-Senior High School * * *. The appropriate damages remedy for the breach of Barbour's renewed contract would be the difference between what [the teacher] would have made had he worked at Hanover for a year (including his grant money), and what he did in fact make at his alternative employment (less his increased travel costs)."
On Criminal Justice
In a 4-3 decision, Justices Eid, Coats and Rice dissented from the majority opinion which concluded that a police officer's search of the defendant and his vehicle, which resulted in the discovery of marijuana and cocaine, was unconstitutional, because the officer's stop was predicated only on the belief that the tree-shaped air freshener hanging from the defendant's-driver's rear-view mirror unlawfully obstructed the defendant-driver's vision.
In dissent, Justice Eid protested that because the trial court had concerns abut the vagueness of the obstructed view statute, it was not adequately able to make a factual finding as to whether the air freshener actually obstructed the defendant's view of the road. Thus, these three justices would have the case remanded to the trial court for further findings.
- Justice Eid concurred with the majority opinion of the Court, which concluded, over the dissent of Justice Coats, that a 13-year-old accused of burglary could not be tried or sentenced as an adult, even though he had turned 14 since the time of the crime, where he had committed the crime when 13. In his dissent, Justice Coats indicated his belief that any lack of jurisdiction over the defendant was waived when the defendant failed to object to being sentenced as an adult, and instead pleaded guilty.
- In a 4-3 decision, Justices Eid, Coats and Rice dissented against the majority opinion, written by Justice Martinez, which concluded that the defendant's confession to sexual assault should not be admitted as evidence against him because the defendant indicated that he had a desire to speak with an attorney prior to making the confession. In his dissent, Justice Coats indicated that "rather than an isolated example of misapplication, the majority's application in this case seems to me to be typical of * * * its hostility or antipathy toward the use of confessions as a tool to solve crimes."
- In a 5-2 decision, Justices Eid and Coats dissented with the majority opinion, written by Justice Martinez, which concluded that, in a first-degree murder case, the defendant's confession to stabbing the victim was not made voluntarily, and therefore was not admissible against him at trial, where, even though the defendant waived her Miranda rights, the defendant's confession was made under "psychological coercion" and "emotional vulnerability" because the questioning officers informed the defendant that the victim had just died from the stabbing wounds; and that the "persistent questioning of the defendant after her emotional breakdown was psychologically coercive." The dissent shot back, noting that the majority's decision would "substantially impact the law of confessions," that "it is difficult for one who is told he is free to refuse to answer questions to complain that his answers were the product of intimidation or psychological coercion," and that "the defendant was not only willing to answer but consistently sought to excuse her own conduct * * *."
On Elections Law
Justices Eid, Coats, and Rice dissented with the majority opinion which struck down a voter-proposed ballot measure that would have created an environmental conservation agency with a mission of protecting land, wildlife, water, and public resources by resolving conflicts between "economic interests" and "public ownership and values" in favor of the latter. The Majority held that the inclusion of the mission and the creation of the agency constituted two separate subjects, and thus that the initiative violated [Colorado's single subject rule].
* ON WHETHER TO TRUST THE WISDOM OF THE VOTERS: "An initiative that joins multiple subjects poses the danger of voter surprise and fraud occasioned by the inadvertent passage of a surreptitious provision coiled up in the folds of a complex initiative. We must examine sufficiently an initiative's central theme to determine whether it contains hidden purposes under a broad theme. The initiative before us today is complex and subtly worded. * * * Despite the statement of the initiative's proponents that the initiative simply creates a new environmental department with a conservation stewardship mission, a plain reading of the initiative reveals that it superimposes onto existing constitutional and statutory provisions the duty to resolve every conflict between “economic interests” and “public ownerships and public values” in favor of “public ownerships and public values.”
Justice Eid authored the dissenting opinion, in which Justices Coats and Rice joined, protesting that "...[a]ccording to the majority, the initiative's proponents can create a new department, but they cannot-without running afoul of the single subject requirement-give that department a mission. * * * [T]he new department's 'conservation stewardship' mission is sufficiently connected to the creation of the department itself.
* ON COLORADO'S SINGLE SUBJECT RULE: "In my view, [the initiative] passes muster under the single subject requirement because it contains a single, easily identifiable subject- namely the creation of a new department of environmental conservation."
* ON WHETHER TO TRUST THE WISDOM OF THE VOTERS: "We have repeatedly held that it is not our role at this stage to construe the proposed initiative. This is a matter “for judicial determination in a proper case should the voters approve the initiative.” Nevertheless, the majority strays into construction in this case by giving the initiative's 'conflict' language an extraordinarily broad interpretation-an interpretation that goes significantly beyond the plain language of the initiative itself.”
* ON WHETHER TO TRUST THE WISDOM OF THE VOTERS: "These 'subjects' proposed by the majority are simply straw men, however, as the initiative's proponents do not suggest any of them. Instead, the initiative is focused on a much narrower theme-that is, the creation of the new department of environmental conservation. Contrary to the majority's suggestion, it would come as no surprise to voters that a new department of environmental conservation would have 'conservation stewardship' as its priority."
* ON ADHERENCE TO PRIOR PRECEDENCE / DEFERENCE TO VOTERS: "In its application of the single subject test today, the majority significantly increases the degree of scrutiny to which we subject proposed voter initiatives, [since] traditionally we have stated that there must be a 'necessary or proper' connection between the component parts of a proposed initiative. * * * Under the [old] standard, the single subject requirement was not violated unless an initiative has 'at least two distinct and separate purposes which are not dependent upon or connected with each other.' * * * In my view, 'conservation stewardship' is sufficiently connected with the creation of the new department to meet the single subject requirement as it has been traditionally defined in our case-law."
* ON BURDENING CITIZEN-DRIVEN INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM EFFORTS: "The majority's approach requires an initiative's proponents to draw their proposal as narrowly as possible, leaving out components that are sufficiently connected with, but not absolutely necessary to, carrying out the initiative's central theme. * * * Taking our cue from the legislature, we have recognized that the single-subject requirement must be liberally construed. * * * The majority's approach flies in the face of this liberal construction by imposing a new level of heightened scrutiny under which all but the narrowest of proposed initiatives will fail. * * * Today's decision effectively requires the initiative's proponents to accomplish a single goal by proposing two separate initiatives-one to consolidate existing boards and commissions into a new department, and a second to give that department a mission to promote conservation stewardship."
* ON WHETHER TO TRUST THE WISDOM OF THE VOTERS: "The proposed initiative might be a good idea or a bad idea; we must leave that decision to the voters."
On Employer and Employee Rights
Justices Eid and Rice dissented with the majority opinion, authored by Justice Martinez, which found that a teacher whose contract was not renewed, but who did not receive timely notice of this failure to renew, (1) was entitled to an entire year's salary; (2) was under no obligation to attempt to mitigate his damages by finding another job; and (3) was entitled to a year's salary even though he immediately found an equal-paying job.
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Allison Eid, objected to the finding that the teacher was entitled to an entire year of back pay where he had not lost a year's salary, since he immediately found another job. The dissent noted that Colorado contracts law is "clear that breach of employment contract damages are to be offset by earnings from alternative employment," and that since this was an employment contract, the court should apply common law contract principles, such as the duty to mitigate damages, and reduce the plaintiff's damages award to the extent that lost earnings were avoided.
* ON ADHERENCE TO COMMON LAW CONTRACT PRINCIPLES: "Mitigation is unnecessary in violations of the statute that governs probationary teacher employment situations * * * the statutory requirement of an additional year of employment prevails over the common law preference for mitigation."
* ON DEFERENCE TO THE LEGISLATURE: "For over forty years, some variation of the probationary teacher renewal statute has been state law. During that time, it has never included a mitigation provision for a wrongfully terminated teacher. That is not to say that the General Assembly has lacked the opportunity to include such a provision. Since the statute's adoption in 1963, the General Assembly has amended the specific provision in question over a dozen times, including completely repealing and reenacting the statute in 1990. * * * [W]e believe it would usurp legislative power for us to change our interpretation to require mitigation simply because we might see the statute differently if we were writing on a clean slate today."
* ON COMMON LAW CONTRACT PRINCIPLES: "That the teacher successfully finds alternative work is immaterial to the fact that the teacher is deemed employed by the school district and entitled to compensation. * * * [W]e find persuasive policy reasons for not requiring mitigation by a probationary teacher [whose contract is not renewed]. If, as here, a school board provided inadequate notice of termination beyond the disputed year and the teacher found alternative employment, the school board could wrongfully-terminate a teacher without repercussion. The statute protects the teacher from a board that fails to give timely notification of termination. It is inconsistent with the purpose of [the statute] that a teacher be deemed employed but neither allowed to return to work nor appropriately compensated for the time employed."
* ON ADHERENCE TO COMMON LAW CONTRACT PRINCIPLES: "When [a] renewed contract is subsequently breached by the district, as occurred in this case, the probationary teacher is entitled to ordinary contract remedies. These include * * * contract damages. Because mitigation is a longstanding principle of contract damages-a principle that the majority fails to employ in this case-I respectfully dissent from Part II.C.2 of the opinion."
* ON ADHERENCE TO COMMON LAW CONTRACT PRINCIPLES: "The majority's mistake, in my view, is to omit an important principle of common law contract damages from that remedy-that is, mitigation. Colorado law is clear that breach of employment contract damages are to be offset by earnings from alternative employment. Here, the majority awards a contract damages remedy that mistakenly ignores a longstanding component of the common law."
* ON ADHERENCE TO COMMON LAW CONTRACT PRINCIPLES AND PUBLIC POLICY: "The majority rejects mitigation on a third ground: public policy. It concludes that mitigation would allow school districts to give insufficient notice “without repercussion” and leave probationary teachers not “appropriately compensated.” In my view, mitigation would lead to neither of these results. The goal of contract damages is to place the plaintiff in the same position he or she would have been in had the breach not occurred-not one that is better or worse. As applied to this case, [the terminated teacher] got paid more in his alternative employment than what he would have made at Hanover Junior-Senior High School * * *. The appropriate damages remedy for the breach of Barbour's renewed contract would be the difference between what [the teacher] would have made had he worked at Hanover for a year (including his grant money), and what he did in fact make at his alternative employment (less his increased travel costs)."
On Illegal Immigration
On Negligence
In a 4-3 decision, Justices Bender, Eid--who wrote the opinion--, Coats, and Martinez (Justices Rice, Mullarkey and Hobbs dissented), successfully argued that the issue of whether the plaintiff driver was negligent, so as to result in a reduction in her damages award, was an issue that should have been submitted to the jury, where evidence was presented that she may, herself, have exhibited a lack of reasonable care, and thus her damages award should have been reduced accordingly. Underlying this case were disputes over (1) whether the conduct of civil plaintiffs should be subject to the same level of scrutiny as that of the defendant, and (2) to what extent judges should defer to a jury of Colorado citizens in determining negligence generally, and more specifically, the comparative negligence of a plaintiff.
* ON LIMITING THE ROLE OF THE JURY / EXPANDING THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE: "The majority held that "a driver is under a duty to drive with reasonable care," and where a defendant presents evidence that a plaintiff may have driven or otherwise acted unreasonably, the question of whether the plaintiff was comparatively negligent should be submitted to the jury. The majority reasoned that "[W]hether there was an emergency and whether the course of conduct chosen under the circumstances was reasonable are questions of fact to be determined by the trier of fact."
* ON PLAINTIFFS' RIGHTS V. DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS: "The dissent would have prohibited the jury from hearing evidence of the plaintiff's potential negligence in causing the accident that formed the basis of the lawsuit. The majority, on the other hand, found such analysis to be factual in nature, and thus to reside within the domain of the jury. Accordingly, the majority opinion focuses more on the possibility that the jury could have made a finding that the plaintiff herself was not entirely free from damages, and could have been found comparatively negligent."
*ON PLAINTIFFS' RIGHTS V. DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS: "The dissent would have held that, in determining whether to turn the issue of the plaintiff's comparative negligence over to the jury, the plaintiff owed only a "narrow duty of care" to the defendant, rather than "a broad duty of care," or even "an ordinary duty of care."
On Property Rights
Justices Eid and Coats dissented with the majority opinion, authored by Justice Hobbs, which concluded that a county was justified in implementing a complete moratorium on the development of property in that county, so that the impact of development could be studied, even though the county did not specify when the moratorium would end, and even though Colorado law, specifically the Land Use Enabling Act only provided for a maximum moratorium of six months.
* ON PROHIBITING OWNERS FROM DEVELOPING THEIR PROPERTY: "The moratorium is an essential tool of successful development. * * * It counters the incentive of landowners to develop their land quickly to avoid the consequences of an impending land use plan for the jurisdiction."
* USING LAW FROM FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS: "Other states have recognized the broad authority of local governments to use moratoria in furtherance of growth planning."
*USING LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO INFER/IMPLY WHAT THE LAW IS: "Our General Assembly has made clear its explicit intent to promote well-planned growth through the Land Use Enabling Act."
Justice Eid authored the dissenting opinion, in which Justice Coats joined, which fervently disagreed with the extent to which the Majority Opinion granted local governments power over private property, specifically noting that "[t]oday, the majority approves a moratorium of limitless duration, one effective 'until formally terminated' * * * [which] exceeds the scope of authority granted to local governments."
*ON PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS: "The right to use one's property is guaranteed by the Colorado Constitution * * * local governments like Pitkin County do not possess a general zoning police power- at least not before today."
*CRITICISM OF THE MAJORITY'S APPROVAL OF THE MORATORIUM: "[T]here is nothing in the moratorium itself that would indicate that it had an end date; the end date was purely discretionary with the County Commissioners. * * * In other words, although the moratorium did in fact last ten months, there was nothing preventing it from lasting twenty or thirty months. * * * The six month time limitation on moratoria * * * should control in this case."
* CRITICISM OF THE MAJORITY'S APPROVAL OF THE MORATORIUM/ DEFERENCE TO THE LEGISLATURE: "The majority attempts to craft a substitute moratoria power: one that is limitless on its face but in fact lasts for what a court, after the fact deems to be a 'reasonable' amount of time. The problem with the majority's substitute power is that it bears little resemblance to the authority actually granted local governments by the General Assembly."
* CRITICISM OF THE MAJORITY'S APPROVAL OF THE MORATORIUM/ DEFERENCE TO THE LEGISLATURE: "* * * [T]he authority that the court recognizes today is so limitless that it can only be described as a general zoning police power. This noting is entirely inconsistent with the Land Use Enabling Act, which expressly imposes a time limitation on the moratoria."
*DEFERENCE TO THE LEGISLATURE: "A moratorium that lasts longer than the six months provided in The Land Use Enabling Act may be a land use tool that counties need to manage growth. * * * But they need to get that authority from the General Assembly, not from us."
Regulation
In a bitterly divided 4-3 decision, Justice Hobbs provided the deciding vote when he concurred in the majority opinion in which the Court adopted the "reverse piercing of the corporate veil" doctrine. This doctrine, previously unrecognized in Colorado, allows a plaintiff to recover against a corporation for the debts/liability of one of its shareholders (as opposed to the traditional "piercing of the corporate veil" doctrine, which allows a plaintiff to recover against a shareholder for debts/liabilities of a corporation in which the shareholder owned shares).
In dissent, Justices Coats, Eid, and Rice expressed outrage, noting that "once again the majority deprives the voters of an opportunity to express themselves on a proposal to limit public fundraising," and further arguing that there was "no principled basis" for treating limitations on "taxation" and "public indebtedness" as "separate subjects."
*REVERSE PIERCING IS "EQUITABLE": "Both types of piercing strive to achieve an equitable result. In traditional piercing, equity requires the veil be pierced to impose liability on a shareholder who has abused the corporate form for his or her own advantage. Similarly, in outside reverse piercing, an equitable result is achieved by ignoring the corporate fiction to attach liability to the corporation. “Indeed, it is particularly appropriate to apply the alter ego doctrine in ‘reverse’ when the controlling party uses the controlled entity to hide assets or secretly to conduct business to avoid the preexisting liability of the controlling party.” Thus, the purpose of obtaining a just result is furthered by permitting outside reverse piercing in Colorado."
* THE USE OF OUT-OF-STATE LAW TO JUSTIFY ADOPTI0N OF THE DOCTRINE": The Majority noted that "a significant number of jurisdictions also recognize outside reverse piercing."
*CASTING THE MAJORITY OPINION AS AN ACTIVIST ADVISORY OPINION ON A PUBLIC POLICY QUESTION, RATHER THAN A LEGAL DETERMINATION: "The majority acknowledges that this Court is “disinclined to adopt a new principle of law in any context other than an appeal,” which has “the benefit of a full factual record.” It nevertheless proceeds to adopt reverse veil-piercing liability in the context of this certified question of law. Because I think that this is an inappropriate case in which to adopt this new form of liability that would permit a shareholder's creditors to reach corporate assets, I respectfully dissent. There are good reasons not to decide cases without a full factual record, and those reasons are even more applicable when adopting a new form of liability. Facts enable the Court to consider how the doctrine works in context, rather than in isolation. As has been noted by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, the court from which the issue in this case was certified, “[t]he laws as to when the courts will pierce the corporate veil are easy to state, but hard to apply.” Indeed, in at least one case addressing traditional veil-piercing, we have declined to apply the doctrine “[i]n the absence of a fully developed factual record and adequate findings of fact.” I can see no reason why reverse veil-piercing should be treated differently."
*ON THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ADOPTING THE REVERSE PIERCING DOCTRINE: "Reverse veil-piercing could have a significant impact on the legal landscape in Colorado. “Generally, a corporation is treated as a legal entity separate from its shareholders.” Thus, the corporate form protects the corporation from risks associated with individual shareholders. A shareholder's creditors can only reach stock issued to and owned by shareholders; corporate assets are shielded. If reverse veil-piercing is permitted, however, the corporation becomes liable for the debts of one (or more) of its shareholders. Accordingly, reverse piercing can prejudice other shareholders and creditors by reducing corporate assets."
*CRITIQUE OF REVERSE PIERCING AS A POLICY: "[A]fter today's ruling, assets of Colorado corporations could be subject to reverse veil-piercing at some time in the future. The recognition of reverse veil-piercing in Colorado will significantly affect (1) the expectations of shareholders with regard to the risks and liabilities to which their investment might be exposed, and hence that investment's value; and (2) the expectations of creditors with regard to the risks to and security of their collateral. There is a significant and fundamental difference between traditional veil-piercing, which allows parties to reach individual assets, and reverse veil-piercing, which permits parties to reach corporate assets."
*A CONSERVATIVE LEGAL APPROACH TO CHANGING THE LAW: "Given that the effect on the expectations of Colorado corporate shareholders and creditors could be substantial, I am unwilling to adopt reverse veil-piercing in a contextual void. Colorado corporate law has operated without reverse veil-piercing liability until now, and it can continue to do so until an appropriate case is brought before us to consider the issue."
In a bitterly divided 4-3 decision, Justices Coats, Rice and Eid dissented with the majority opinion (written by Justice Hobbs) in a debt collection case, which created a new standard of law to apply to debt collection cases: [the least sophisticated consumer standard]. Under the standard, the majority noted that correspondence from creditors will by judged as to whether it sufficiently conveys requisite notices and other disclaimers so that the "least sophisticated" of consumers would understand it. Pursuant, the Majority found that the Creditor violated that standard in this case by "burying" disclosures in "fine print," and by communicating two different deadlines: a 30 day deadline to dispute the debt, and a 39 day deadline to take advantage of the settlement offer.
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Eid, strongly disagreed, stating that the Majority's rule "penalized creditors for permitting consumers to contact them by phone and for giving consumers additional time to consider a settlement offer after they dispute a debt," and "may well harm consumers in the long run," and posited that "after today, to avoid any such 'confusion' posited by the majority, collection agencies may simply prevent consumers from contacting them by phone. For many consumers, however, phoning is the easiest, most convenient, and most accessible means of communication." The dissent further noted that "even the least sophisticated consumer can be presumed to possess a rudimentary amount of information about the world and a willingness to read a collection notice with some care." It finished by noting that "[t]oday's opinion, combined with federal case-law, effectively prohibits collection agencies from setting any deadline for acceptance of settlement offers, * * * will discourage, or perhaps bar, settlement offers in Colorado," even though "for many consumers, accepting a settlement offer will be the best option."
On Taxes
Current Salary
$119,739 per year.
See Also
External Links
- NNDB profile of Justice Eid
- Justice Eid at Project Vote Smart
- Colorado Supreme Court
- Eid bio from Colorado Supreme Court
- Eid bio from University of Colorado
- University of Colorado SC Press Release
- Eid Appointed to Supreme Court Rocky Mountain News
References
- ↑ Supreme Court election results from the Denver Post
- ↑ United States Department of Justice
- ↑ Rocky Mountain News
- ↑ State Capitol decked in purple lights
- ↑ Owens Names Solicitor General To Supreme Court
- ↑ CCJL Applauds Governor's Appointment of Eid to High Court
- ↑ Owens appoints 'premier legal scholar' to court
- ↑ Owens Names Solicitor General To Supreme Court
- ↑ Owens Names Solicitor General To Supreme Court
- ↑ Original Defend Colorado Now Amendment
- ↑ Rocky Mountain News
- ↑ Second Amendment Project
