Dale Wainwright

On Contract Enforcement

Nationwide Insurance Company vs. Elchehimi (2008)^[15]

Contract Enforcement-Personal Injury-Uninsured motorist

Issue: Does an axle-wheel assembly separated from an unidentified semi-trailer constitute a "motor vehicle" in order to satisfy the "actual physical contact" provision of Texas's uninsured motorist statute?

Factual and Procedural History: On January 4, 2002, a station wagon collided with a drive axle and attached tandem wheels that had separated from an eighteen-wheel semi-trailer truck. The unidentified truck, which was being driven in the opposite direction across the divided highway, did not stop. Momentum carried the axle-wheel assembly across the dividing median where it struck the station wagon, injuring the occupants and damaging the car. The County Court, Ellis County, granted insurer's summary judgment motion, and insured appealed. The Waco Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. Insurer petitioned for review.

Governing Rule: [F]or the insured to recover under the uninsured motorist coverage if the owner or operator of any motor vehicle that causes bodily injury or property damage to the insured is unknown, actual physical contact must have occurred between the motor vehicle owned or operated by the unknown person and the person or property of the insured^[16]

Summary: Justice Wainwright, over the dissents of Justices O'Neill and Medina, ruled that an insurance company was not required to pay an uninsured motorist claim because an axle-wheel assembly separated from an unidentified semi-trailer does not constitute a "motor vehicle," and therefore, does not fall within the terms of the policy and the Texas Insurance Code. The Court held: (1) motor vehicles are self-propelled (2) the collision does not involve a legally recognized substitute for the statute's actual physical contact requirement (3) adopting an integral part test to determine whether actual physical contact occurred would be inconsistent with the test established by the legislature and would be unmanageable

Quotes from the majority opinion"

• ON WHY THE AXLE-WHEEL ASSEMBLY IS NOT A MOTOR VEHICLE: "A drive axle with two tandem wheels attached on one side lacks an engine or other means of propulsion. It is therefore neither a self-propelled vehicle nor a vehicle propelled by electric power from overhead wires. This wheel assemblage is not capable of carrying a load, nor can it be towed down a road by a self-propelled vehicle other than being dragged by or mounted underneath one, as Elchehimi's expert witness testified. The axle-wheel assembly is thus not a trailer or semitrailer designed for use with a self-propelled vehicle. The axle-wheel assembly is not a motor vehicle under Chapter 601. Applying the common usage of the term and the definition in Chapter 601, we conclude that physical contact with a detached axle and tandem wheels is not actual physical contact with a motor vehicle under the unidentified motor vehicle provision."

• ON WHY THE COLLISION DID NOT INVOLVE A LEGALLY RECOGNIZED SUBSTITUTE FOR THE STATUTE'S ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTACT REQUIREMENT: "Because the axle-wheel assembly is not a motor vehicle, it cannot fill the role of an intermediary vehicle to provide indirect contact between the unidentified truck and Plaintiff's vehicle." No other substitute exists for the requirement of actual physical contact with the motor vehicle itself. Texas courts have uniformly rejected the contention that a collision with cargo and other objects falling from a car satisfies the requirement of actual physical contact with a motor vehicle^[17]

• ON WHY THE COURT DID NOT ADOPT THE INTEGRAL PART TEST: "We decline, however, to adopt an integral part test not present in the text of the statute and inconsistent with the relatively bright line established by the Legislature. Moreover, such a test would be practically unmanageable, requiring a case-by-case analysis to determine if a part was substantial enough to serve as a proxy for a motor vehicle. This would lead to a line-drawing conundrum for courts of appeals. The Legislature did not create an exception to the statute's requirement of actual physical contact with a motor vehicle, and we decline to do so. In addition, "creation of an integral part test would force courts to draw lines in each case along a continuum, to determine whether a particular part was large or important enough to be 'integral,' whether the part was a piece of the vehicle or merely cargo, and whether the part was contemporaneously separated from the vehicle or had lain in the roadway long enough to become debris. All of these questions would open the door to uncertainty and potential fraudulent or fictitious claims, which the Legislature saw fit not to do."

Quotes from the dissenting opinion"

• ON THE DISSENT'S PROPOSED INTEGRAL PART TEST: "In my view, when an integral part of an unidentified vehicle is propelled by the vehicle's momentum and, in a continuous and unbroken sequence of events, collides with an insured's vehicle, “actual physical contact” with a “motor vehicle” has occurred and coverage is afforded under the statute. Because the Court holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent."

• ON WHY THE MAJORITY'S TEST IS CONTRARY TO THE STATUTE'S LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE "Nothing in the statute itself compels the Court's conclusion that only a collision with the motor vehicle as a whole will satisfy the statute, and the Court's restrictive interpretation of section 1952.104(3) places that provision in tension with the UM statute's fundamental purpose." "We have repeatedly and consistently held that because the UM statute is remedial, it should be construed liberally to give full effect to the Legislature's purpose in enacting it-to provide coverage to insured motorists."

On Labor Law

Igal vs. Brightstar Information Technology Group, Inc. and Brba, Inc. (2007)^[18]

Labor Law-Jurisdiction-Res Judicata

Issue: Does the principle of res judicata bar an employee from bringing a common-law claim against employer to recover unpaid wages after the Texas Workforce Commission(TWC) dismissed his claim as untimely filed?

Factual History: Plaintiff, under employment agreement with Defendant, alleges that Defendant terminated his employment without cause on Jan. 19, 2000, which entitled him to post-termination salary. Eighteen months later, Plaintiff filed a wage loss claim with TWC.

Summary:Judge Wainwright authored the majority opinion, over the dissents of Judges Brister, Jefferson, and O’Neill, which ruled that when a claimant pursues a wage claim to a final adjudication before the TWC, res judicata bars the claimant from later filing a lawsuit for the same damages in a Texas court of law. The court held: (1) the TWC had subject matter jurisdiction (2) the doctrine of res judicata bars the plaintiff from pursuing relief in a court of law after obtaining a final decision in TWC for the same transaction.

QUOTES FROM THE MAJORITY'S DECISION"

• On Why the TWC had Subject Matter Jurisdiction: “We interpret the words of the Legislature to have created the 180-day filing limitations period as a mandatory condition to pursuing the administrative cause of action and not as a bar to TWC's exercise of jurisdiction. TWC's use of the word “dismissed” in its order does not alter its jurisdiction. TWC had jurisdiction over Igal's claim.”

• On Why Res Judicata Bars the Plaintiff's Claims: once a claimant who has alternate proceedings at his disposal to obtain relief available under the Payday Law pursues an administrative claim to a final decision, he forgoes his common law claims. To pursue a common law remedy for the same wages as sought *89 in his payday claim, a claimant must withdraw his administrative claim before the agency issues a final decision. Because Igal did not withdraw his administrative claim prior to TWC's final determination, res judicata will bar his claim if TWC's order is considered final for the purposes of res judicata.

QUOTES FROM THE DISSENT'S DECISION"

• On the Dissents Reasoning: The Texas Legislature passed the Payday Law to give unpaid workers a quick alternative to lengthy civil litigation. But today the Court holds they lose everything if they pursue that alternative a little too late, even though years remain to file suit in court. This is not about biting apples twice; this is about a man's wages, a claim that like many others can be filed a second time if the first disposition was not on the merits. By holding Payday claims dismissed for tardiness cannot be refiled in court, the Court converts a law giving extra options to workers into a trap where they may forfeit all their rights.