HTK Management, L.L.C. v. Seattle Popular Monorail Authority (2005)

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In HTK Management, L.L.C. v. Seattle Popular Monorail Authority, 155 Wn.2d 612, 121 P.3d 1166 (Wash. 2005), the Washington State Supreme Court upheld a local authority’s condemnation of private property. Although the Seattle Popular Monorail Authority conceded that only one-quarter to one-third of the parcel would be permanently needed for the station, it initiated condemnation proceedings for the property owners’ entire parcel.

Case facts and trial court proceeding

Although many internees lost all their possessions in the wake of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066, immigrant railroad laborer Henry T. Kubota (“HTK”) found a loyal friend to manage his property and return it to him upon his release. After Kubota’s death in 1989, his descendants managed his property in a historic part of downtown Seattle under his namesake, HTK Management, L.L.C. HTK’s parcel was well-known for the Sinking Ship garage that was constructed and operated on the property.

In 2002, the local Seattle Monorail Authority (Monorail) identified HTK’s parcel as a potential monorail station site. HTK learned this from a local newspaper rather than direct contact from the agency, but expressed willingness to collaborate with the Monorail so that Monorail could build a station on a portion of HTK’s parcel and HTK could realize Kobuta’s dream of redeveloping the remainder of the parcel. At some point during negotiation, the Monrail passed a resolution to acquire HTK’s entire parcel by condemnation.

At a subsequent trial court hearing on pubic use and necessity, Monorail conceded that the station’s footprint would occupy only one-quarter to one-third of the parcel. Monorail contended that condemnation of the remainder property was needed for construction staging and staff parking activities.

While conceding the station and construction staging may be public uses, HTK countered that the temporary nature of the staging and parking did not justify a fee simple interest in the remainder property. At the hearing HTK also presented evidence that Monorail sought agency profit from the remainder property through its anticipated increase in value following station construction and a subsequent sale of the remainder property to developers. The trial court sided with Monorail, entering a judgment of public use and necessity.

Legal issue

The Justices of the Washington Supreme Court sparred over the scope of protections and standard of review mandated for the takings of private property under the Washington State Constitution. Unlike the federal constitution, the Washington Constitution’s provision for takings makes explicit that the exercise of eminent domain for public use is subject to judicial review. Under Article I, Sec. 6 of Washington’s Declaration of Rights:

"Whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question, and determined as such, without regard to any Legislative assertion that the use is public."

According to Washington State jurisprudence, for a proposed condemnation to be lawful, the condemning authority must prove that (1) the use is really public, (2) the public interest requires it, and (3) the property appropriated is necessary for that purpose.

The majority and dissent differed as to whether "public necessity" declarations by condemning authorities are part of the constitutional "public use" question (and therefore subject to judicial a higher level of judicial scrutiny) or whether "public necessity" declarations are separate from "public use" declarations and therefore require significant judicial deference to condemning authority determinations.

Majority opinion

By a 7-2 vote, the majority of the Washington Supreme Court upheld Monorail’s condemnation of the property and rejected HTK’s constitutional claims.

Writing for the majority, Justice Barbara Madsen thrice denied any resemblance between the case at hand and Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). Justice Madsen read Art. I. Sec. 6’s plain provision that “the question [as to] whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question,” as providing that a legislative declaration of “public use” is “entitled to great weight.” Justice Madsen went on to contend that a local authority’s determination of “public necessity” for the exercise of eminent domain was a “legislative question” that was “conclusive in the absence of actual fraud or arbitrary and capricious conduct, as would constitute constructive fraud.” In addition, Madsen insisted that decisions as to the type and extent of property interest necessary to carry out the public purposes are legislative questions, thereby announcing “the rule” that “decisions as to the amount of property do be condemned are legislative questions, reviewed under the legislative standard for necessity.” Finally, Madsen cited the present case’s involvement with “one of the most fundamental public uses for which property can be condemned - public transportation” and affirmed the trial court’s finding of public use and necessity.

Chief Justice Gerry Alexander and Justices Susan Owens, Charles Johnson, Bobbe Bridge, Tom Chambers, and Mary Fairhurst joined Justice Madsen’s opinion.

Dissenting opinion

In dissent, Justice James Johnson offered, if only in passing, the first published judicial opinion from a state court calling Kelo’s soundness into question. The focus of Justice Johnson’s dissent, however, was upon the majority’s reluctance to give credence to the state constitution’s plain language or its previous enforcement in Washington case law. Justice Johnson sharply criticized the majority’s interpretation of the tri-partite “public use” test. Justice Johnson cited early cases from the Evergreen State holding that because municipal corporations have no inherent power of eminent domain that such exercise can only take place in accordance with express statutory authorization, and because statutes conferring such power are in derogation of the common right, they “must be strictly construed, both as to the extent of the power and as to the manner of its exercise.”

In unmistakable terms, Justice Johnson asserted that it is “stupefying” to give “great weight” to legislative determinations of public use and necessity when the constitutional provision for takings explicitly states that the question of public use shall be a judicial question, “without regard to any Legislative assertion that the use is public.”

Justice Johnson also contended that an inquiry into public necessity of a taking is a corollary judicial construct to the public use inquiry. Going beyond the majority’s conclusion that public necessity declarations are conclusive absent fraud or constructive fraud, Justice Johnson cited case law for the proposition that a declaration of necessity is neither upheld where there is arbitrary or capricious conduct, manifest abuse of discretion, violation of law, improper motives, or collusion. Cases cited defined arbitrary and capricious conduct as “willful and unreasoning action and taken without regard to the attending facts or circumstances.” Justice Johnson concluded that the record established that Monorail’s action was arbitrary and capricious and based upon improper motives.

Justice Richard Sanders joined the dissent.

Subsequent case history

Seattle citizens voted on November 8, 2005 to terminate the Monorail Project. Subsequently, HTK and Monorail reached agreement to allow HTK to keep its property in exchange for its agreement to drop all claims against Monorail. However, entry of the stipulated judgment was opposed by the holder of a long-term lease on the property and a sublessee that operated a parking garage thereon. The King County Superior Court entered a judgment vacating the stipulated judgment and dismissing the condemnation action, entering a judgment awarding the lessee and sublessee costs and attorneys fees. Division One of the Washington State Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment vacating the stipulated judgment and the dismissal of the condemnation action but remanded the case on the matter of attorneys fees. See In the Matter of the Petition of the Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 139 Wn. App. 772 (Wash. Ct. App. Div. 1. 2007).

Legislative response to HTK and eminent domain abuse

Following Kelo, HTK and the Washington Supreme Court's ruling in Regional Transit Authority v. Miller, 156 Wn.2d 403 (Wash. 2006), Washington State Attorney General Rob McKenna requested legislation to create a special task force to examine Washington State's law of eminent domain and to make proposals to better protect private property rights. Legislation creating the task force was passed in 2007. Several bills limiting the power of eminent domain by state and local authorities were introduced in the Washington State Legislature in the years immediately following the decision in HTK.

Related cases

  • Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
  • In re Condemnation Petition of Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 139 Wn. App. 772, 162 P.3d 1147 (Wash. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007).
  • Washington State Convention & Trade Center. v. Evans, 136 Wn.2d 811, 966 P.2d 1252 (Wash. 1998).

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