Justice Michael Gableman on Contract Enforcement

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Wambolt v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co. (2008)

Justice Gableman was REVERSED by the District III Court of Appeals, which held that he committed error in dismissing an injured plaintiff’s case against another motorist’s insurance company. The Appellate Court held that Justice Gableman erred in applying Minnesota, rather than Wisconsin law, where the accident happened in Wisconsin, the victim was Minnesota, and the driver who struck the vehicle was from Wisconsin. The Appellate Court further held that Justice Gableman should have applied Wisconsin law since “we conclude the better rule of law is to enforce contracts that provide insurance coverage and compensate tort victims.”




Chute v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co. (2007)


Judge Gableman was REVERSED by the District III Court of Appeals, which held that he committed error by construing an insurance policy contract so as to dismiss an injured plaintiff’s case against another motorist’s insurance company. Judge Gableman found that an insurance company was not responsible for covering an accident that happened after its insured driver had sold the insured car to a different person who then wrecked the car and injured another person in the process. The Court of Appeals held that the insurance company was responsible for insuring the car, regardless of who owned it, even though the contract indicated that it did not cover individuals who drove the car in cases where the insured party would not have the authority to grant them permission to do so. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found that anyone using the vehicle was "insured," where Judge Gableman had found that only the individual who purchased the insurance and owned the car was "insured."


Pearson v. Cobb (2005)

Judge Gableman was REVERSED by the District III Court of Appeals, in a case where he refused to require the defendant to pay the plaintiff's attorney fees, even though the parties' contract required that "Purchaser shall reimburse Seller and Agent for all costs incurred for the recovery of stumpage monies owed the Seller, including but not limited to attorney's fees, court costs, and time." The Appellate Court held that this provision was unambiguous, and that Judge Gableman should have ordered reimbursement for attorneys fees, rather than imposing his own standard-- that attorneys fees were not required because there was no evidence of "bad faith."

See also