Phillips v. Mirac, Inc. (2004)
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In the case, the majority ruled that a cap on damages enacted by the Michigan state legislature did not violate the right of the plaintiff to a trial by jury, equal protection, or due process.
The decision is viewed as pivotal in the separation of powers-focus jurisprudence of the modern Michigan court.
- In this liability damages cap case, the court addressed the question whether Legislatively-enacted damage caps violated the state’s constitution by depriving plaintiffs equal protection, due process, or a jury trial. Regeana Diane Hervey, while a passenger in a car driven by another party, was killed in an accident. The vehicle had been leased from the defendant, an Enterprise Rent-A-Car franchise. Phillips, mother of the deceased, sued the franchise under a law (MCL 257.401(3)) which establishes liability for automobile lessors when permissive users (the driver, in this case), are negligent and cause an accident injuring others. The statute also capped damages for such lessors at $20,000 for each injured person to a maximum of $40,000 for each accident. The trial court ruled the caps were unconstitutional, the Appeals Court reversed and the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals.
- The crux of the issue is whether the “right of jury trial” includes as part of its meaning the right of having a jury determine damages and the jury’s determination being above correction by either the Legislature or the courts; the other issues – equal protection and due process – followed as a matter of course from the first question about the right of jury trial. The court drew on common law references that predated Michigan’s statehood to illustrate that,
“...certain elements... have long been regarded as the ‘essence’ of trial by jury” including “unanimity, impartiality, and competence of the jury” and that “the only matters ‘properly within the province of the jury’ are questions of fact.”
The United States Supreme Court (Tull v. United States (1987)) also concluded that the role of the jury is confined to finding facts and that matters of law were for the court, including the assessment of civil penalties. Writing for the majority, Justice Taylor also quoted Thomas Jefferson who wrote “...Juries therefore... determine all matters of fact, leaving to the permanent judges to decide the law resulting from those facts.” Joining Justice Taylor’s opinion were Justices Corrigan, Young and Markman; Justice Weaver concurred that the statute did not violate the three rights in question, but wrote her own opinion to support that conclusion.
- In dissent, Justice Cavanaugh (joined by Justice Kelly) dismissed the Legislature's role in setting public policy, referring on multiple occasions to the "alleged" government interest and "alleged" crisis in the automobile rental industry; doing so, Justice Cavanaugh suggests he knows better than the Legislature and his judgment would be superior to theirs. Justice Cavanaugh's dissent deftly frames the question as one of a perceived crisis in the automobile rental business versus actual injured plaintiffs, choosing not to focus on the clear separation of powers issues such as the role of the courts and the Legislature.
