Talk:Denham Springs Economic Development District v. All Taxpayers, Property Owners, and Citizens of the Denham Springs Economic Development District (2006)

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Welcome to the discussion page for Denham Springs Economic Development District v. All Taxpayers, Property Owners, and Citizens of the Denham Springs Economic Development District (2006).

POTENTIAL FLAWS IN THE COURT'S REASONING:

(1) Pursuant to Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company, government must provide "notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of their pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." In Mullane, the United States Supreme Court further stated:

  • "Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home outside the area of the newspaper's normal circulation the odds that the information will never reach him are large indeed. The chance of actual notice is further reduced when ... the notice required does not even name those whose attention it is supposed to attract, and does not inform acquaintances who might call it to attention. In weighing its sufficiency on the basis of equivalence with actual notice we are unable to regard this as more than a feint."
  • The Louisiana Supreme Court further noted, in Lewis v. Succession of Johnson (2006), that it was bound to follow U.S. Supreme Court precedent from Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams (1983), holding “notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any party, whether unlettered or well versed in commercial practice, if its name and address are reasonably ascertainable.”
  • In other words, where a liberty or property interest exists, the Due Process Clause requires that known people be contacted, at least by mail.
  • Here, the Court's simple recitation that the Denham Development District lacked evidence necessary to contact individual homeowners affected by the project is horribly unconvincing. All that was necessary was a letter to all homes within the development district, the geographic boundaries of which were readily ascertainable.


(2) The court notes that "only when protected interests are implicated does the right to some kind of notice or hearing attach." The homeowners and others claimed to have been deprived of their right to challenge the legality of the Bass Pro TIF project. The court noted that the parties lacked a sufficient interest in challenging the TIF project because that right was statutory, and the right expired after 30 days. This conclusion overlooks the entire krux of the argument-- that, the only reason they did not challenge the TIF project within 30 days was that they recieved insufficient notice. Thus the court has effectively concluded that the challengers did not have a right to notice, because they did not have a property interest, while simultaneously holding that they lacked a property interest only because they did not receive proper notice.