Thomas Kilbride
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Thomas L. Kilbride is a justice on the Illinois Supreme Court.
Justices of the Illinois Supreme Court are elected to serve ten-year terms in partisan elections; Kilbride serves as a Democrat. His current term expires in 2010.
Biography
A native of LaSalle, Justice Kilbride withdrew from college in 1972 to work for George McGovern's presidential campaign. After Nixon's election, he stayed in Chicago to work for the United Farm Workers before moving to San Diego for three years to organize local unions there. Justice Kilbride received a B.A. degree magna cum laude from St. Mary's College in Winona, Minnesota in 1978 and earned his J.D. from Antioch School of Law in Washington, D.C., in 1981.[1]
Legal background
Justice Kilbride practiced law for 20 years in Rock Island, engaging in the general practice of law, including appeals, environmental law, labor law, employment matters, and other general civil and criminal matters. He was admitted to practice in the United States District Court of Central Illinois and the United States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. He was elected to the Supreme Court of Illinois for the Third District in 2000.
On the issues
On Class Action/Class Action Abuse
- Justice Kilbride concurred in the majority opinion, written by Justice Thomas R. Fitzgerald, which concluded amongst other things, that defendant Intel's representation that its Pentium 4 computer processer was the best and fastest on the market, in contrast to its prior model, the Pentium 3 processer, was not a statement subject to attack as fraudulent, or as a "deceptive business practice" under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. In so ruling the Court overturned the decision of the circuit judge where the case originated, in notorious Madison County, Illinois.
- Justice Kilbride dissented from the majority opinion of [Rita B. Garman], which held that Based on these other authorities, read in conjunction with Illinois law, we conclude that the FTC could, and did, specifically authorize all United States tobacco companies to utilize the words “low,” “lower,” “reduced” or like qualifying terms, such as “light,” so long as the descriptive terms are accompanied by a clear and conspicuous disclosure of the “tar” and nicotine content. Thus Philip Morris could not be liable for defrauding smokers by using these terms, even if the terms were not accurate. In so ruling the Court overturned a contrasting $10.1 billion jury award out of notorious Madison County, Illinois.
THE MAJORITY'S HOLDINGS:
- "[W]e conclude that the FTC could, and did, specifically authorize all United States tobacco companies to utilize the words “low,” “lower,” “reduced” or like qualifying terms, such as “light,” so long as the descriptive terms are accompanied by a clear and conspicuous disclosure of the “tar” and nicotine content in milligrams of the smoke produced by the advertised cigarette." On this basis, the Court reversed the Circuit Court, ruled in favor of Philip Morris, and negated the $10.1 billion verdict.
HOLDING IN JUSTICE KARMEIER AND JUSTICE FITZGERALD'S CONCURRING OPINION
"[P]laintiffs failed to establish that they sustained actual damages. In reaching this conclusion, I hasten to add, as the majority opinion did, that rejection of plaintiffs' cause of action should in no way be construed as an endorsement of [Philip Morris]]'s conduct. Our reversal of the circuit court's judgment is not an exoneration of [Philip Morris]. It is merely a conclusion that this particular cause of action by this particular group of claimants seeking this particular form of recovery cannot be sustained under the law of Illinois.
HOLDING IN JUSTICE FREEMAN'S DISSENTING OPINION (WITH JUSTICE KILBRIDE CONCURRING)
The court's action today is predicated upon an erroneous and irresponsible interpretation of our Consumer Fraud Act, an act which I note is to be interpreted so as to give full protection to the citizens of this state against the fraudulent conduct of others. The protection of consumers from unfair practices is, of course, a traditional state police power function. The court's construction of section 10b(1) serves not only to dilute needlessly the force of our state consumer protection legislation, but to limit unnecessarily our state's citizens' consumer protection in this area to a federal agency. For these reasons and because I do not agree that Philip Morris was exempt from liability under section 10b(1), I cannot join in the court's opinion. Rather, I would hold that the FTC did not specifically authorize Philip Morris, within the meaning of section 10b(1) of the Consumer Fraud Act, to use the disputed descriptors. I therefore respectfully dissent.
HOLDING IN JUSTICE KILBRIDE'S DISSENTING OPINION (WITH JUSTICE FREEMAN CONCURRING)
* It is apparent that the complaint against American Brands was directed at particular advertising used only by that company. The order forbade only American Brands from making the reduced tar claims, and authorized only American Brands to use “low tar” descriptors only if accompanied by conspicuous disclosures of tar and nicotine content. The order cannot reasonably be viewed as directing the use of the descriptors. Indeed, it prohibited their use unless certain conditions were met. No reference whatever is made to the descriptors “light” or “lights,” as used by [Philip Morris]. The plain facts, therefore, demonstrate no basis to conclude that “lights” is a like qualifying term to “low in tar.” Thus, even if other cigarette marketers read the published consent order, they could not reasonably conclude it specifically authorized any descriptors other than “low tar” or “lower in tar.” Nor could they conclude that the agreed resolution of the Commission's claim against American Brands was anything other than the compromise of a disputed claim. It was not, and did not purport to be, a rule or regulation permitting the entire cigarette industry to use these or any other descriptors.
On Criminal Justice
- Justice Kilbride concurred in the vigorous dissent of Charles E. Freeman which departed from the majority opinion of Justice Lloyd A. Karmeier, which concluded amongst other things, that although a judge cannnot defer to a sheriff's department in allowing all criminal defendants to be wired with electronic stun belts, and although stun belts are only warranted where a manifest need is shown, the wiring criminal defendants with electronic stun belts during their trials did not, on its own, violate the defendants due process rights, or rights to a fair trial.
On Employer and Employee Rights
- Justice Thomas L. Kilbride concurred in the majority opinion, written by Justice Thomas R. Fitzgerald, concluded, amongst other things, that the defendant, a labor union that falsely picketed the plaintiff corporation with signage indicating that the corporation was paying its workers below the prevailing wage, was entitled to have the jury's punitive damages award against it reduced from $325,000 to $50,000, under the belief that the award represented a 75 to one ration of punitive damages to compensatory damages, and was thus in violation of the labor union's due process rights.
- Justice Rita Garman was the lone dissenting vote, noting that "[b]ecause I believe the majority's decision in this case does not adequately vindicate the goals of punitive damage awards, I respectfully dissent. While the majority cites the goals of punishment and deterrence as informing its punitive award against the union, the resulting award of $50,000 does not achieve the purpose of those goals."
On Negligence
- Justice Kilbride concurred in the majority opinion, written by Justice Rita B. Garman, over the vigorous and lenghty dissent of Justice McMorrow, in which Justice Charles E. Freeman joined concluded that, where a driver errantly drover her vehicle over the sidewalk and into a Burger King restaraunt, causing the death of a patron sitting in the restaruant, Burger King owed a legal duty to that patron to protect him. In doing so, the Court abandoned the opposite precedent, which had been established in Illinois in Stutz v. Kamm (1990) (Court refused to impose premises liability where a driver had driven through a wall and into a waiting room because the injury was unforeseeable); and Simmons v. Aldi-Brenner Co. (1987) (storekeeper and owners had no duty to protect customers against injury caused by driving automobile through storefront)
On Property Rights
- Justice Kilbride concurred in the majority opinion, written by Justice Rita B. Garman, in a case where Chicago Alderman Charles Bernardini proposed a zoning change to prohibit the construction of the plaintiff's apartment building after plaintiff had already begun construction of the apartment building, and that zoning change became effective the following month, established two rules: (1) that a property owner has a vested right to continue building, or in the alternative is entitled to compensation, if the property owner made substantial expenditures prior to the indroduction of a later-passed zoning ordinance that would otherwise prohibit such building; and (2) that a property owner's investments in development are at his own peril once an amendment that would prohibit his development has been officially proposed.
On Regulation
- Justice Kilbride concurred in the majority opinion, written by Justice Thomas R. Fitzgerald, which concluded amongst other things, that defendant Intel's representation that its Pentium 4 computer processer was the best and fastest on the market, in contrast to its prior model, the Pentium 3 processer, was not a statement subject to attack as fraudulent, or as a "deceptive business practice" under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. In so ruling the Court overturned the decision of the circuit judge where the case originated, in notorious Madison County, Illinois.
- Justice Kilbride dissented from the majority opinion of [Rita B. Garman], which held that Based on these other authorities, read in conjunction with Illinois law, we conclude that the FTC could, and did, specifically authorize all United States tobacco companies to utilize the words “low,” “lower,” “reduced” or like qualifying terms, such as “light,” so long as the descriptive terms are accompanied by a clear and conspicuous disclosure of the “tar” and nicotine content. Thus Philip Morris could not be liable for defrauding smokers by using these terms, even if the terms were not accurate. In so ruling the Court overturned a contrasting $10.1 billion jury award out of notorious Madison County, Illinois.
THE MAJORITY'S HOLDINGS:
- "[W]e conclude that the FTC could, and did, specifically authorize all United States tobacco companies to utilize the words “low,” “lower,” “reduced” or like qualifying terms, such as “light,” so long as the descriptive terms are accompanied by a clear and conspicuous disclosure of the “tar” and nicotine content in milligrams of the smoke produced by the advertised cigarette." On this basis, the Court reversed the Circuit Court, ruled in favor of Philip Morris, and negated the $10.1 billion verdict.
HOLDING IN JUSTICE KARMEIER AND JUSTICE FITZGERALD'S CONCURRING OPINION
"[P]laintiffs failed to establish that they sustained actual damages. In reaching this conclusion, I hasten to add, as the majority opinion did, that rejection of plaintiffs' cause of action should in no way be construed as an endorsement of [Philip Morris]]'s conduct. Our reversal of the circuit court's judgment is not an exoneration of [Philip Morris]. It is merely a conclusion that this particular cause of action by this particular group of claimants seeking this particular form of recovery cannot be sustained under the law of Illinois.
HOLDING IN JUSTICE FREEMAN'S DISSENTING OPINION (WITH JUSTICE KILBRIDE CONCURRING)
The court's action today is predicated upon an erroneous and irresponsible interpretation of our Consumer Fraud Act, an act which I note is to be interpreted so as to give full protection to the citizens of this state against the fraudulent conduct of others. The protection of consumers from unfair practices is, of course, a traditional state police power function. The court's construction of section 10b(1) serves not only to dilute needlessly the force of our state consumer protection legislation, but to limit unnecessarily our state's citizens' consumer protection in this area to a federal agency. For these reasons and because I do not agree that Philip Morris was exempt from liability under section 10b(1), I cannot join in the court's opinion. Rather, I would hold that the FTC did not specifically authorize Philip Morris, within the meaning of section 10b(1) of the Consumer Fraud Act, to use the disputed descriptors. I therefore respectfully dissent.
HOLDING IN JUSTICE KILBRIDE'S DISSENTING OPINION (WITH JUSTICE FREEMAN CONCURRING)
* It is apparent that the complaint against American Brands was directed at particular advertising used only by that company. The order forbade only American Brands from making the reduced tar claims, and authorized only American Brands to use “low tar” descriptors only if accompanied by conspicuous disclosures of tar and nicotine content. The order cannot reasonably be viewed as directing the use of the descriptors. Indeed, it prohibited their use unless certain conditions were met. No reference whatever is made to the descriptors “light” or “lights,” as used by [Philip Morris]. The plain facts, therefore, demonstrate no basis to conclude that “lights” is a like qualifying term to “low in tar.” Thus, even if other cigarette marketers read the published consent order, they could not reasonably conclude it specifically authorized any descriptors other than “low tar” or “lower in tar.” Nor could they conclude that the agreed resolution of the Commission's claim against American Brands was anything other than the compromise of a disputed claim. It was not, and did not purport to be, a rule or regulation permitting the entire cigarette industry to use these or any other descriptors.
Civic activities
Justice Kilbride is a past board member, past president and past vice-president of the Illinois Township Attorneys Association, a past volunteer lawyer and charter member of the Illinois Pro Bono Center, and a member of the Illinois State Bar and Rock Island County Bar Associations. He has served as volunteer legal advisor for the Community Caring Conference, the charter chairman of the Quad Cities Interfaith Sponsoring committee, volunteer legal advisor to Quad City Harvest, Inc., and a past member of the Rock Island Human Relations Commission.
References
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